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The Future of Telecommunications,




Revisiting the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "'96 Act")
several years later, one meets dear old friends. There's
Interconnection, for example. And over there, good old RBOC long-
distance service, looking as depressed as ever. And here is good old
State Jurisdiction. And there, High Cost Areas, with its tax shelter
accountants. Among such trusty companions, does one dare to speak
of the future as anything but a continuation of the past?
Let us instead look ahead, to telecommunications ten years
hence, and to the regulatory environment of 2020. The technology
will not be radically different, just cheaper, smaller, faster, and spread
throughout society. But even these near-term trends, exponential at
present, add up to much change. For example, if one believes in the
growth scenarios of e-commerce companies the way Wall Street does,
we will have in 2020 one-half of the population employed as web
masters, and the other half driving UPS delivery trucks.
The decade of the 1990's was dominated by the revolution in
processing power, based on the fundamental VLSI technology
advances of the 1980's. For awhile, transmission could not keep up
with processing, because it was much more expensive to widen the
channels than to add more powerful chips, and therefore bottlenecks
emerged. But in the next decade, transmission will be the driver
instead of the brake.
And what will be the impact of these trends? The most obvious
one is a drop in prices, as transmission becomes a commodity. For
example, MCI WorldCom's winning bid for the Federal
Government's FTS 2001 included projected per-minute pricing of less
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than I cent per minute. Similarly, for international transmission, new
projects will raise capacity to unheard levels. While trans-Atlantic
capacity was 5.1 Gbps in '94 and 65 Gbps in '99, it will be 865 Gbps in
2003-almost a quadrupling every two years. As that happens,
international calls become priced at a flat rate, near zero. On an
architectural level, networks become engineered for data, not voice.
Bandwidth becomes a substitute for switches. And with flat pricing,
monthly phone bills will probably become unnecessary.
But this is as far as the conventional providers of hype will take
you: to a world with abundant information, in which all of mankind is
linked up and well informed, in which information conquers illness,
ignorance, and poverty, and in which democracy thrives. How
wonderful. And how naive. It's a bit like techies rhapsodizing a
hundred years ago over the automobile: There will be no smelly
horses anymore! And everyone will take a leisurely fun drive to work
in the morning! And the sky will be blue!
The problem is, the Internet is part technology (packet switched
networks and applications) and part inkblot test, into which everyone
projects her or his fantasies and nightmares. Some find pornography.
Others find the New Man, free at last, with no hierarchy in the way.
Others look at government and find it obsolete. Take the regulation
of telecommunications: In this telecom environment of plenty, is
there any use for telecom regulation? The knee jerk response is, NO.
Thank you, Mr. Regulator, it's been a nice long century together. But
now, we've got the Internet!
Part of this is wishful thinking-a preference for a return to the
Garden of Eden before the apple and the Macintosh. The idea being,
when we return to the state of plenty, regulation will disappear. The
notion of the withering away of the State had been held by Marxists
and utopian socialists. Today it's become the worldview of Wall
Street insiders and Silicon Valley billionaires with imperfect grasps on
history.
Of course, part of the traditional regulatory agenda becomes
unnecessary. Price regulation. Profit regulation. Quality regulation.
Protectionist rules on foreign ownership. Even interconnection. But
that does not mean absence of regulation, and this is not just because
some bureaucrats cannot let go. Regulation exists in response to
interest groups. Whether they are incumbents, entrants, consumers,
rural residents, or large users, these interest groups will never go
away. And others will emerge.
If anything, the easy communication of the Internet will make it
easier for interest groups to organize themselves. Just remember
when the issue of Internet access charges came up: the FCC,
Congress, and the White House were inundated by a campaign of
millions of e-mail messages, and they beat a hasty retreat. So what is
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it that all of these stakeholder groups will want? At least 10 things:
1. Redistribution. In a democratic system, a majority always
wants something from the minority. Many people believe that
somehow the efficiency of competition will shrink the subsidy slice of
the pie to zero. But that assumes that the pie does not grow.
2. E-commerce and consumer protection. In the past, the Internet
confronted little resistance in the political sphere. It faced public
fascination-and rightfully so. Eyebrows were raised over porn and
privacy, both politically correct targets of complaints. But, this will
inevitably change. As the Internet moves from a nerd preserve to
shopping mall and mass medium, it is unrealistic to expect that it will
be treated differently than the rest of society's transactions. Which
means that it is unrealistic to expect that it will be left alone.
Inevitably, there will be problems of fraud, misrepresentation,
and theft; therefore, there will be pressures for consumer-protective
regulation. Many people believe that one cannot regulate the
Internet, even if one wanted to. After all, don't high school kids run
electronic circles around flat-footed government rules? Sure. But
that only proves that it is difficult to go after the electronic part of a
transaction. But that is not the end of the story. If one cannot reach
the bits, one can go after the physical parts. If one cannot block
mobile elements, one can try to reach the static ones. Networks.
People. Institutions. Assets. Land. Customers. This might not be
elegant, but neither is the tax code. There are plenty of ways to do so,
many of them involving the carriers and service providers, which puts
them into the laps of telecom regulation.
3. The problem of trade wars. Zero-cost global transmission
leads to a realignment of commercial transactions. And here, U.S.
firms will dominate. They will be at the leading edge technologically,
with risk capital at their disposal, with the advantage of early entry
and a large home market. Once one establishes a successful model
for the U.S. market, and once transmission price is near zero, there is
no reason to stop at the border.
But this success will lead to backlash. Big losers are always good
in at least one thing: organizing themselves. Inevitably, they will use
the domestic and international regulatory apparatus to slow things
down. (One can see it already: in the trans-Atlantic fights over
privacy, in the "national culture" quotas, in the fights over domain
name registration, and in the fights over electronic signatures and
authentication.) But who are we to complain? Right now, the
Clinton administration is going around the world preaching Internet
free trade zones.
But imagine how the tune will be different when we face a
serious influx of Mexican tele-doctors. Monaco tele-gambling.
Bahamian tax dodges. Thai child tele-pornography. Nigerian
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securities deals. There is no way the U.S. would let this happen
without protective regulation. And here, too, telecom providers and
ISP's will be forced to patrol their systems.
4. Monopoly power. Many people believe that issues of market
power do not apply to the Internet, because it is so wide open that
any dog can start its own business. We are told that the bit economy
plays by different economic rules than the atom economy, that
silicon-based transactions are different from those based on carbon,
and similar nonsense.
It is unclear why packet switching would make Adam Smith
obsolete. We might indeed observe that computer communication
and market power have been kissing cousins for a long time: AT&T.
IBM. Microsoft. Intel. Each of them deserves a chapter in any
textbook on antitrust. And why should it stop here? Yahoo? AOL?
Amazon.com? Are they the next chapters? Presumably, these
companies are trading at such high levels because of investor
expectations of abnormally high profits, not because of a competitive
return. The economic logic is relatively simple. Development costs
are high, marginal costs are low. So there are large economies of
scale. Brands are important. First entrants have advantages. There
are network externalities. The Internet may still have the image of
small is beautiful, but the reality is changing fast.
Now, some might object and point out how easy it is to set up a
web page. True, but that's for a narrowband world, and even there
less and less so. In a broadband Internet world, websites will be
multimedia, with video and with lots of bells and whistles. User
expectations will grow. Development costs will zoom, and entry
barriers will become much higher, just as they are in movies,
newspapers, and major software. And when that happens, some
Internet submarkets will become heavily concentrated. Inevitably,
calls for antitrust, breakups, and fully-separated subsidiaries will
emerge.
Other issues that will emerge on the regulatory agenda:
5. Privacy protection.
6. Intellectual property right protection.
7. Education and training.
8. Taxation and incentives to maintain innovation.
9. Content standards. Congress keeps trying. Right now, the
pressure is for "self-regulation" that is supposedly voluntary.
10. Legacy rules. Let us not forget that we do not start from
scratch. In the process of implementing the '96 Act and its policies
(the two were not always the same), the FCC and the States have
added in recent years a vast amount of regulation, usually in the name
of competition. We regulate to deregulate. And the clarification and
harmonization of these rules, and their upgrade to new circumstances
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will add much more still. We are creating a system which, in the old
days, Lenin would have chosen, if only he had had computers.
The implication is that to reduce legacy regulation one cannot
expect that technology and abundance will do it. One has to go and
change the equilibrium. But one should not be unrealistic regarding
what can be achieved. A libertarian paradise will not happen,
because while it is easy to embrace such a model in the abstract,
everyone has a little exception in mind, a little help that they need.
(See, for example, how the ISP industry has started to seek the
regulation of the cable TV industry.)
One way to change the equilibrium is simply to abolish the FCC.
Which is what, for example, the Heritage Foundation proposes. But
that would leave the field to the state commissions-which Heritage
presumably likes even less-it means, practically speaking, abolishing
the state commissioners, too, at least for telecommunications. Also,
even if the U.S. does away with its regulation, other countries will not.
So we may end up substituting regulation from Washington and
Sacramento for regulation from Brussels. And in any event, this
solution may feel good, but it is not likely to solve the problem. The
interest groups in question will find some forum that will take up their
case. Remember Judge Greene: was it any better, as a process, to
have an elderly judge with two law clerks slowly and non-expertly run
the American telecom industry structure?
The alternative is to focus on substantive policy, not on
institutional structure. If one wants to deal with legacy regulation,
one should do so-affirmatively and proactively. This would mean
that a commission and a legislature would look ahead and set goals
for getting out of certain regulations with a clear time frame. It
means formulating an endgame scenario. In five years, we could be
rid of much of the traditional baggage.
The problem here is the potential for dilatory action of
incumbents in the meantime. But that could be dealt with by setting a
schedule, with steps and dates along the way, as well as penalties
(including a second divestiture) and rewards.
This is an ambitious agenda, but if one does not set one's sights
high, one ends up the slow ship in the convoy to the Information Age.
This does not mean the disappearance of state or federal regulation in
the communications sector. It means that these institutions need to
become expert in new areas. Privacy. Consumer protection in the
cyber field. Broadband and media. Dealing with new types of
market power. To do so the regulatory bodies need to transform
themselves from early twentieth century utility-style commissions to
early twenty-first century communications-protection agencies. Look
forward. Change the culture. Change the expert mix. Accelerate the
decision cycle.
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What, then, is the conclusion? Like it or not, regulatory bodies
for communications will continue to exist as vessels through which
society establishes some control mechanisms on the revolutionary
electronic environment. To expect otherwise feels good, but good
feelings are not what Washington is about.
